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INTRODUCTION
Civil rights attorneys and activists seeking to change felon disen-
franchisement laws continue to file legal challenges in state and federal
court. However, these lawsuits rarely succeed, and because many state
courts and federal circuits have now rejected the strongest constitutional
arguments against felon disenfranchisement,' voluninous case law fortify-
ing felon disenfranchisement laws has developed. 2 Indeed, throughout
American history, advocacy groups used the courts as vehicles for change,
but frequent rejections of challenges and landmark decisions also stifled
the progress of social movements.3 Although legal scholars continue to
1. See Johnson v. Governor of Horida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945 (11th Cir.
Apr. 12, 2005); Angela Behrens, Note, Voting---Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at
Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MiaN L. R v. 231, 254
(2004).
2. This Note does not seek to rehash the history of challenges to felon disenfran-
chisement laws in the courts. For a discussion of this history, see ALEXANDER KEYssAR, THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMocRAcY IN THE UNITED STATES 308
(2000); Behrens, supra note 1.
3. See Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Con-
stitution," 76 N.YU. L. REV. 1456 (2001); see also LEVERAGING TIHE LAW: USING THE
COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 8 (David A. Schultz ed., 1998):
For some, the federal courts have proven to be trusted allies in furthering the
cause of social reform, performing its function of protecting discrete and in-
sular minorities and otherwise policing the political process to keep the
channels of representation open. For others, the federal courts have proven
themselves either to be clumsy agents at producing lasting social change or
usurpers of political power rightly lodged in the states or with Congress and
the President.
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debate the merits of challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws, and the
development of new arguments against these state laws remains a popular
topic of scholarship,4 the opening for legal challenges to felon disenfran-
chisement laws may be closing.'
In contrast, significant potential for change exists in the state legisla-
tures.6 Unlike the courts, where the doctrine of stare decisis limits the
ability of the court to revisit legal arguments established in previous deci-
sions,7 legislatures can repeatedly revisit the same issue each term. For this
reason, state legislatures provide a limitless arena for challenges to felon
disenfranchisement laws.
Much of the current literature discussing felon disenfranchisement
laws focuses on the laws in the context of the civil rights, race, and suffrage
4. See, e.g., John R. Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of
Felony Disenfranchisement, 26 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 157 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Nathan P Litwin, Note and Comment, Defending an Unjust System: How
Johnson v. Bush Upheld Felon Disenfranchisement and Perpetuated Voter Inequality in Florida, 3
CoNs. PuB. INr. L.J. 236, 269 (2003) (discussing the how the case law gives the Supreme
Court "ammunition to shoot down the plaintiff's arguments against Florida's felon disen-
franchisement law"); Martine J. Price, Note and Comment, Addressing Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs. Litigation, 11 J.L. & PoL'y 369, 407 (2002) (finding that
"[e]fforts to attack disenfranchisement laws should be concentrated on the state and local
legislatures").
6. The focus of this Note is on the states because, remarkably enough, the right to
vote even in federal elections varies by state. The constitutionality of any changes to state
election laws by Congress is an unsettled question. In his testimony to the House Judiciary
Committee on a proposed bill to enfranchise ex-felons, Roger Clegg, Vice President and
General Counsel for the Center for Equal Opportunity, argued strongly against Congress'
authority to change federal election qualifications based on Article 1, Section 4. He said:
In The Federalist No. 60, Alexander Hamilton said of Article I, Section 4, that
the national government's 'authority would be expressly restricted to the
regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifi-
cations of the persons who may choose or may be chosen ... are defined and
fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by any legislature.' (Emphasis in
original.) In The Federalist No. 52, James Madison had written of Article I,
Section 2: 'To have left it [that is, '[t]he definition of the right of suffrage']
open for the occasional regulation of Congress, would have been improper
.... Hamilton and Madison believed that generally the state constitutions
would determine who voted; Congress, in any event, would not.
The Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999)
(alterations in original) (statement of Roger Clegg, Vice President and General Counsel,
Center for Equal Opportunity), at http://www.ceousa.org/clegg2.html. Clegg's interpre-
tation of Article 1, Section 4 has been used by conservative congressmen to discourage the
passage of a federal ex-felon enfranchisement law. Under current interpretations, any
change Congress makes would at best extend only to federal elections.
7. For a discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis, see Note, Constitutional Stare
Decisis, 103 H~Asv. L. REv. 1344 (1990).
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movements.' Additionally, most of the commentary on felon
disenfranchisement correctly traces the origin of these laws to the
"well-documented history of majority groups seeking to deny the right
to vote to particular minority groups in the United States." '9 Race and
fundamental rights frame many of the traditional arguments against felon
disenfranchisement because the historical and current impact the laws
have on the makeup of the electorate is a crucial part of equal protection
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws.10
Although it is tempting to assume that the same arguments made
before the courts carry over as effective arguments in the state legislatures,
this assumption is probably not accurate. Arguments based on fundamen-
tal rights may have pulled at the heartstrings of the citizen representatives
found in the legislatures fifty years ago, but today's state legislatures are
professionalized and the legislators are more partisan, pragmatic, and cal-
culating." In the legislatures, partisan politics, not race, frames the debate.
This examination of the institutional changes to state legislatures,
synthesized with an analysis of the handling of felon disenfranchisement
laws by state legislatures, presents a troubling realization about the law
today: in the twenty-first century, partisan politics moderates decisions
about even the most basic and fundamental principles of democracy. This
Note suggests that because state legislators follow their party leadership
and position, a state's traditional treatment of racial minorities, geographic
location, and even ideology are not the strongest indicators of a state's
8. See, e.g., INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: TuE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IM-
PRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Jamie Fellner & Marc
Mauer, The Sentencing Project, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws
in the United States (Oct. 1998), available at http://wvww.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/
9080.pdf, Paul Hirschfield, Losing the Prize? Assessing the Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement
Laws on Black Male Voting Participation (Paper presented at the Law and Society Association
annual meeting, Jan. 10, 1999) (on file with author) (suggesting that felon disenfranchise-
ment laws are "reminiscent of Jim Crow electoral laws"); Mary Fainsod Katzenstein &
Katherine Davison Rubin, How Different? A Comparison of the Movement Challenging Ex-
Felon Disenfranchisement with Suffrage Politics of an Earlier Time (Paper presented at the
American Political Science Association annual meeting, Aug. 29, 2002) (on file with au-
thor).
9. See Behrens, supra note 1, at 246.
10. This challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws has been attempted where there
is evidence that the legislature enacted the felon disenfranchisement law with the purpose
of disenfranchising minorities. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Cotton v.
Fordice, 157 E3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Johnson v. Bush, 214 E Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D.
Fla. 2002).
It. See generally Gary F. Moncrief et al., The Old Statehouse, It Ain't "hat It Used to




disenfranchisement laws. Rather, partisan politics drives changes to the
state laws governing felon voter eligibility."
A. Felon Disenfranchisement: Impact on the
Racial Makeup of the Electorate
Felon disenfranchisement laws substantially impact the makeup of
the American electorate. Approximately 4.7 million Americans, or more
than 2% of adults, are barred from voting because of felon disenfran-
chisement laws.'3 Almost three-quarters of the disenfranchised population
are no longer in prison but are on probation, parole, or have completed
their sentences. 4 Over 1.7 million disenfranchised Americans are ex-
felons who have finished serving their entire sentence.'"
The demographic makeup of disenfranchised Americans largely
mirrors the makeup of the prison population. 16 It is estimated that 1.4
million Black men, or 13% of all Black men in the United States, are dis-
enfranchised by the laws; this rate is seven times the national average. 7 In
the six states that do not allow any ex-offenders to vote, one in four Black
men is permanently disenfranchised.
There is no sign of change in the near future, as rates of incarcera-
tion continue to rise. 9 Estimates show that at the current rate of
12. See The Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 906
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(1999), at http://www.ceousa.org/clegg2.htm.
13. Editorial, Felons and the Right to Vote, N.YTIMEsJul. 11,2004, at 12.
14. Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Democratic Contraction? The Political Conse-
quences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 777, 778 (2002).
15. The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfianchisement Laws in the United States, avail-
able at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,2005).
16. See Litwin, supra note 5, at 240 (finding "[p]roportionally over 16% of voting age
African Americans in Florida cannot vote").
17. The Sentencing Project, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. In a NEw YORK TIMES editorial that he wrote just ten days before leaving office,
in honor of Martin Luther King Day, President Bill Clinton wrote that he agreed with
WE.B. DuBois when he said "the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color
line." William Jefferson Clinton, Editorial Desk, Erasing America's Color Lines, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2001, at 17. In the editorial, President Clinton outlined what he believed were the
greatest civil rights problems that America would face in the 21st century. He discussed
drug laws, crime, prison policy, and the death penalty. But the issues that he spent the most
space discussing were related to voting rights and election law:
We must do more to ensure that more people vote and that every vote is
counted. To that end, I urge the new administration to appoint a nonpartisan
presidential commission on electoral reform, headed by distinguished citizens
like former presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. Such a commssion
should gather facts and determine the causes-in every state-of voting
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incarceration, three in ten of the next generation of Black men will be
disenfranchised at some point in their lifetime, and certain states will dis-
enfranchise 40% of their Black male residents in the next decade. 2' These
statistics demonstrate the way in which felon disenfranchisement laws
impact the racial makeup of the electorate by significantly reducing the
number of eligible Black voters.
Because felon disenfranchisement impacts the racial makeup of the
electorate so significantly and because many of the disenfranchisement
laws were originally enacted as a way of suppressing the electoral power
of racial minorities, many of the court challenges focus on the laws' racial
impact. However, it is important to recognize that in state legislatures,
where partisan politics drives policy, the racial makeup of the disenfran-
chised may not be important in and of itself; rather, it may be important
to the extent race connects to political party.
B. Syllabus
Part I of this Note describes the professionalization of state legisla-
tures in the United States. Over the last fifty years, significant structural
changes have altered the way in which state legislatures operate and also
the role that partisan politics plays in the decision-making process. Part II
examines the partisan nature of felon disenfranchisement laws. Such laws
are somewhat unique because not only is the battle to change them po-
litically charged, but the result of any legal change impacts politics itself
by changing the makeup of the electorate. This Part concludes that any
changes to felon disenfranchisement laws will be made based on partisan
politics and suggests a framework for determining where such changes
may occur. Part III examines three states with professionalized legislatures
disparities, including those involving race, class and ethnicity. It should make
recommendations to Congress about how to achieve fair, inclusive and
uniform standards for voting and vote counting. It should also work to
prevent voter suppression and intimidation and to increase voter
participation.
Here are two places to start:We should make Election Day a national holiday.
And it is long past time to give back the right to vote to ex-offenders who
have paid their debts to society.
Id. Just a few months earlier, voting rights may not have been an issue that President Clinton
would have included in his final editorial in the NEwYORK TIMES before leaving office, but in
the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election and the controversy that surrounded the
upcoming inauguration of President George W Bush on January 20, 2001, voting rights
were a major concern for Americans. It was in this spirit that President Clinton made
voting rights the focus of two recommiendations he gave to the new administration. Id.
20. The Sentencing Project, supra note 15.
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in which the felon disenfranchisement laws have recently changed. This
section demonstrates that partisan politics drove those changes. Part IV
scrutinizes the complexities of the partisan interests in Massachusetts, a
state that was reassessing prisoner voter eligibility, and Delaware, a state
with an "unprofessionalized" legislature.
L.THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF STATE LEGISLATURES
To understand the role that partisan politics plays in state legislatures,
it is important to be familiar with how state legislatures operate today, and
how changes to legislatures over the last fifty years affect the interests of
today's legislators. Three significant periods of institutional change to state
legislatures occurred in the post-World War II era: Reorganization, Pro-
fessionalization, and Institutionalization.2 These changes have led to a rise
in the role of partisan politics at the state level.
State legislatures in the United States were traditionally citizen legis-
latures that did not look anything like the politicized legislatures of today.
Partisan politics was not a strong force in state government for most of
American history; as one scholar observed at the beginning of the 20th
century:
In practice ... most questions of State legislation and admini-
stration are not party questions; and political differences
between the chief executive and the legislature are less serious
than in the national government. Serious conflicts in State af-
fairs between the two branches are indeed as likely to arise
when they are of the same party as when they are of opposing
parties.
22
Although not a great deal of literature focuses on the history of state leg-
islatures prior to the 1950s, 3 political scientists generally agree that
"[a]mong U.S. political institutions, few have undergone the degree of
change experienced by state legislatures.
-'4
At the Founding, state legislatures enjoyed a great deal of power,
largely in reaction to the distaste colonists had for the colonial governor, a
near monarchy which was only accountable to England.25 Thus, the first
state constitutions made the governorship an elected position, and in order
21. See Alan Rosenthal, Is the Party Over? Trends in State Legislative Parties, SPECTRUM:
J ST. Gov'T 5, 6-8 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenthal, Is the Party Over?].
22 John A. Fairlie, The State Governor: I, 10 MICH. L. REv. 370, 375 (1912).
23. See John A. Worthley, Public Administration and Legislatures: Past Neglect, Present
Probes, 35 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 486,486-90 (1975).
24. Moncriefet al., supra note 11.
25. See Fairlie, supra note 22, at 370.
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to maintain a powerful legislature, the legislatures elected the governor."
But by about 1850, as state government expanded and the need for a
more centralized administration emerged, those states that did not already,
switched to hold their gubernatorial elections by direct popular vote.and
made gubernatorial terms longer.2" The state governor was no longer di-
rectly accountable to the state legislature and "the position of the State
governor ... [was] strengthened to a notable extent ... by the expansion
of State administration and a considerable increase in the appointing
power of the governor." '28 The result was a significant increase in the
power of the governor relative to the legislature.29 Between the 1850s and
the middle of the twentieth century, governors dominated state political
power and few scholars questioned this unbalanced power structure.3"
When scholars began examining the institutional strength of state legisla-
tures in the 1950s and 1960s, they found "moribund institutions" that
needed considerable reorganization if they were to regain the position of
power they enjoyed at the Founding."
Until the 1950s, the political and administrative processes of state
governments received little attention. 2 However, after the Hoover Com-
mission examined administrative reorganization at the federal level,
33
government reorganization generated increased academic and public in-
terest, and many states began examining their administrative processes.34
26. Id. at 371.
27. Id. at 372.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 375-79 (discussing the powers of the governor over the legislative
process).
30. See Worthley, supra note 23, at 486-90.
31. See Moncrief et al., supra note 11.
32. For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Malcolm E. Jewell, The Neglected
World of State Politics, 44 J. POL. 638, 638-57 (1982); Carl W Stenberg & David B. Walker,
Federalism and the Academic Community:A Brief Summary, 2 PS 155,155-67 (1969).
33. As Herbert Hoover wrote, "one of the important purposes of the [Hoover]
Cormmssion was to open the doors of understanding of the functions of our government
to our people at large." NEIL MAcNEIL & HAROLD W METZ, THE HoovER REPORT 1953-
1955:WIIAT IT MEANS ToYou AS CITIZEN AND TAXPAYER (1956).The bulk of the meetings
for the Hoover Commission occurred between 1953 and 1955, but there have been other
commissions with similar purposes that have spun off from that original group of meet-
ings, some have even used the name "Hoover."
34. See John A. Perkins, Reflections on State Reorganizations, AMER. PoL. SCI. REV. 507
(1951) ("Many of the states that are now considering what should be done to overhaul the
structure of their administration have been prompted to do so by the recent populariza-
tion of the administrative reorganization idea brought about by the Hoover Commission
report and by public interest in it.").
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A. Reorganization in the 1960s and 1970s
In the late 1960s and 1970s, many states completely modified their
state legislatures politically and changed their capitols physically. The goal
of the modifications was to make legislatures more powerful in relation to
the executive branch, or governor.35 A 1971 report by the Citizens Con-
ference on State Legislatures made seventy-three recommendations to all
fifty states and a number of recommendations to individual states as to
how state legislatures could become more modern, professional, efficient,
and member-friendly.
6
During this period of reform, legislators began spending more time
working during legislative sessions and between sessions.37 Forty-three of
the states changed their constitutions so that the legislature could meet
annually, instead of biennially, and legislatures in some of the more popu-
lous states began meeting year-round." The extra time helped the
legislatures accomplish four main goals: become more involved in poli-
cymaking; help shape the state budget; play a role in running the
government itself; and become a constant presence that could serve as a
check to executive power.
39
TABLE 2.1
ANNUAL AND BIENNIAL LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS
IN THE STATES, 196o AND 20014




Capitol buildings were expanded or rebuilt. Not only was increasing
the space and expanding the property a practical move to make room
for larger staffl, but the symbolic act of making the Capitol into a
35. See SARAH .F LIEBSCHUTZ, NEW YORK POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: COMPETITION
AND CoMPAssION 85 (1998) (discussing the changes made in NewYork state).
36. See Alan osenthal, State Legislative Development, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 169, 171
(1996) [hereinafter Rosenthal, State Legislative Development].
37. See id.
38. California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, and
NewYork began to stay in session throughout most of the year at this time.
39. See Rosenthal, State Legislative Development, supra note 36, at 171.
40. Keith E. Hamm & Peverill Squire, A 'Tools of the Trade' Look at Comparing Con-
gress with State Legislatures (Paper presented at the American Political Science Association
annual meeting, Aug. 29-Sept. 2, 2001) (on file with author).
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legislature-centered complex gave legislators a sense of empowerment.
Legislators, who traditionally worked from home or met outside of the
Capitol complex, now worked from their government offices. The
addition of meeting rooms accommodated caucus discussions and
committee hearings1
The reform movement succeeded in altering the way that state gov-
ernments operated, but nowhere was the increase in legislative resources
more apparent than in the large increase in staffs. As the legislatures mod-
ernized, larger staffs met the increasing workload of legislators.4 ' In
addition, legislators started receiving expert political and policy advice on
decisions they made.
Today, many legislators in larger states have staffs that mirror those of
United States Congressmen. For instance, in NewYork state:
The legislature now has the staff to conduct its own analyses
and to form its own proposals. There are now staff members
who have been through numerous budget negotiations and
who are quickly able to determine the governor's position.
They have 'institutional memory' and are not ignorant of past
debates and decisions. There are staffs who conduct long-range
studies on policy development and oversight. Staff of the As-
sembly Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee either conduct or contract for economic forecasts
for the state to help guide them in preparing analyses of an-
ticipated revenues. Legislative staff members still rely on
executive branch agencies for information, but the era when
the legislature had to rely on executive branch personnel for
interpreting that information is over. 3
With the ability to personally assist or perform favors for more con-
stituents, larger legislative staffs helped to secure more support for their
bosses. Legislators sent out more press releases, answered more letters,
wrote more legislation, and took more politically savvy positions. Al-
though staff members are not supposed to partake in political activity
while being paid by the state, staffs began to take care of a great deal of
the legislative work, thus leaving more time for legislators to fundraise
and campaign." All in all, staffs provided a huge electoral advantage for
41. See kosenthal, State Legislative Development, supra note 36, at 170,
42. EDWARD SCNEIFE & JOHN BnsaN MURTAUGH, NEW YORK POLITIcs: A TALE OF
Two STATES 98 (2001).
43. LIEnscHtrrz, supra note 35, at 85.




incumbents.45 That advantage helped to jumpstart the second major pe-
riod of institutional change for state legislatures: professionalization.
B. Professionalization
In 1974, Alan Rosenthal wrote that "there is widespread agreement
among political scientists that turnover in state legislatures is excessive and
that rapid turnover detracts from the performance of both the lawmaking
and watchdog functions and weakens the institution."46 At the time, many
legislators did not view their positions as full time jobs. But after the
workload increased during the period of reorganization and legislative
positions gained prestige, legislators began taking their positions more
seriously and focused more effort on their legislative duties.
Unlike the deliberately planned process of reorganization, profes-
sionalization was a somewhat inadvertent consequence of the
reorganization process." "As state legislatures ... improved their decision
making capability through procedural changes, longer sessions, increased
staff, and better resources, they also ... created the conditions for a differ-
ent breed of legislator; that is, legislators who find the new professional
institution an attractive place in which to build a career. 
4
As indicators of professionalization, political scientists generally use
compensation levels, size of staff, time spent in session, and continuity of
service by legislators." During the 1980s and early 1990s all of these
indicators rose dramatically, suggesting a significant increase in the profes-
sionalization of legislatures.50
Salary increases during the 1980s also helped to professionalize the
states' legislatures. In some larger and more professionalized states, a legis-
lator could make a living working solely in that capacity. For example, in
his 1993 analysis of retention in the New York state legislature from
45. Kenneth Silver, New York's Nightmare Legislature, 5 CiTY J., Spring 1995 ("Many
staffers who perform constituent services during the legislative session go on temporary
leave during election season to work on campaigns.").
46. Alan Rosenthal, Turnover in State Legislatures, 18 AM.J. POL. Sci. 609 (1974).
47. These changes have not been universally embraced. In an attempt to quell the
movement towards professionalization, some states looked for ways to purge career politi-
cians from the legislatures. Concerns over institutionalization and its potential negative
effects on representative government led many legislatures to consider term limits in the
early 1990s. In fact, over forty states considered such limitations in 1991. Many states
opted not to impose term limits. The failure to pass such laws is a testament to the desire
of legislators to remain in office and make a career out of legislating. See generally Cynthia
Opheim, The Effect of US. State Legislative Term Limits Revisited, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 49
(1994).
48. See Moncrief et al., supra note 11, at 57.
49. See Rosenthal, State Legislative Development, supra note 36, at 174-
50. See id.
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1870-1990,Jeffrey Stonecash found that even when adjusting a legislator's
salary for inflation against the Consumer Price Index, today's salaries are
still substantially greater than those of the past, and the largest salary in-
creases have come since 1980." Similar patterns of salary increases during
this time period have been documented in legislatures across the coun-
try.
52
But maybe the most significant trend of the 1980s and 1990s was
the high rate of incumbent success in legislative elections, which climbed
to mirror that of the United States Congress." Essentially, legislators ran
for reelection at a higher rate and succeeded more often.
5 4
Finally, the number of legislators listing "Legislator" as their full time
occupation rose in the 1980s and 1990s.1s These professional legislators
had a lot more to lose in an election than their predecessors, as a defeat at
the polls meant a loss of their career rather than merely a leisure pursuit.
As a result of professionalization, legislators in the 1990s needed
more political savvy, so they utilized polling data and consultants to help
ensure reelection. The politics of legislatures in many states began to re-
flect those of the United States Congress. 6
C. Institutionalization
Arguably, the period of institutionalization overlapped with the pe-
riod of professionalization, and many states remain in the process of
institutionalization today." Alan Rosenthal borrowed Nelson Polsby's no-
tion of institutionalization as it applied to the United States Congress and
used it to look at the changing role of the legislature in the 1990s." He
noted three important characteristics of an institutionalized legislature.
First, the membership is stable and largely unchanging. The leadership is
recruited internally and the membership has a significant term of office.
51. Jeffrey M. Stonecash, The Pursuit & Retention of Legislative Office in New York,
1870-1990: Reconsidering Sources of Change, 26 POLIT 301,305 (1993).
52. See Rosenthal, State Legislative Development, supra note 36, at 174.
53. See Moncrief et al., supra note 11, at 58.
54. See Rosenthal, State Legislative Development, supra note 36, at 187.
55. See id. at 180.There are two explanations for this change. First, with the increase
in time and salary, legislators could afford to legislate as a full time job. Second, because
legislating took up a substantial amount of time, the only citizens who could afford to
serve as legislators were those who were independently wealthy or dependent on a family
member.
56. See Peverill Squire, Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State
Legislatures, 17 LEGis. STUD. Q. 69 (1992).
57. See Rosenthal, State Legislative Development, supra note 36, at 183.
58. See id. at 185.
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Second, the organization is complex and difficult for outsiders to under-
stand. The functions of the organization are internally separated and there
is a clear division of labor among the membership. In addition, members
have aids such as salaries, allowances, staffs, and office space. Third, the or-
ganization uses "universalistic criteria" to select its leaders instead of
unrestricted methods of doing internal business. In other words, experi-
ence and seniority are more important than talent and expertise."
During the 1990s, many state legislatures came to exhibit the three
criteria listed above. Additionally, some individual party caucuses became
institutionalized themselves. A majority party in each state selects the
Speaker of the House or President of the Senate, and its majority caucus
appoints all major committee heads and doles out the committee assign-
ments. In almost all states, the majority party controls its chamber's
organization, overseeing rules and deciding how to maximize its power
through closed caucus meetings.' Because of the complexity of the poli-
tics and operations of the legislature, senior legislators can expect to hold
better positions within the party and legislature as a whole. Consequently,
it is difficult for a freshman legislator to gain substantial power.
The institutionalization of legislatures centralized political power in
the party leadership and caucus. Thus, loyalty to one's party became nec-
essary to gain political power, and partisanship became fiercer.'
D. The Role of Partisanship in Institutionalized Legislatures
As a result of reorganization, professionalization, and institutionaliza-
tion, state legislatures today differ greatly from a half century ago.
Legislating is now a full time job in many states, and legislators reap the
electoral benefits of large resources and professional staffs. Because of the
increase in prestige and salary, legislators, now more than ever, make their
decisions based on electoral politics and carefully consider the impact of
each policy decision on their electoral chances.
The decision-making process in today's legislatures is much more
complex than it was in the past.62 Legislators pay attention to the desires
of their constituents but also to their party leadership, lobbyists, and voter
registration.
63
59. See id. at 184.
60. See generally Ronald D. Hedlund & Keith E. Haemm, Political Parties as Vehicles for
Organizing U.S. State Legislative Committees, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 383 (1996).
61. See Rosenthal, Is the Party Over?, supra note 21, at 8.
62. See Paula L.W Sabloff, The Decision Process of a Professionalized Legislature: A Cog-
nitive Anthropology Approach, 17 POL. BFHAV. 403 (1995).
63. See ROCER DAVIDSON & WALTER OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERs 275
(2000) (discussing the "predisposition and conversation" model).
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Institutionalization led to an increase in the importance of political
parties for state legislatures. In order to receive appointments to
committee chairmanships and funding from political action committees,
legislators must maintain loyalty to their parties. Since most legislators
hope to make a career out of elected office, they want to continue to
move up the ladder of seniority and receive internal promotions. 64 Thus, a
legislator is like any employee in a large company; he focuses his efforts
on promotion within the internal structure by being loyal and valuable to
his boss. Loyalty to one's political party, one's boss, is paramount for
success.
E. Ambition and Leadership Selection
Legislators have an incentive to vote the party position on key issues
because of their own personal ambitions within the institution. Because
many districts are gerrymandered so that one party has a significant ma-
jority and voters usually vote the party line, incumbents have an
extraordinarily high rate of success in contested general elections.6"
Malcolm Jewell and David Breaux found that from 1968 to 1986 the rate
of incumbent success rose only slightly, largely because incumbents al-
ready won at an extremely high rate in 1968." Most legislators do not
have to worry about reelection, and legislators in these "safe" positions
may concern themselves with climbing the institutional ladder."
With increased salary and prestige, leadership positions and commit-
tee chairmanships attract the budding legislator. Just as any employee
64. . For example, in New York state, the legislature as an institution has become a
political force of its own, taking priority over any other interests:
For more than two decades, a Republican majority has controlled the State
Senate, and a Democratic majority has controlled the State Assembly.The re-
sult has been government by quid pro quo-the two majorities posturing
over their differences while tacitly collaborating to accommodate the per-
manent interests of each, usually by spending more public money. New York
State is governed, in effect, by a single Incumbency Party, dedicated above all
to preserving its own power and privileges.
Silver, supra note 45.
65. Malcolm E. Jewell & David Breaux, The Effect of Incumbency on State Legislative
Elections, 13 LEGIS. STU. Q. 495 (1988).
66. Id.
67. See Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996, 44 Am. J. POL.
Sci. 35 (2000) ("Partisan loyalties in the American public have rebounded significantly
since the nid-1970s, especially among those who actually turn out to vote-"). Bartels con-
cludes that partisan loyalties of voters have led to partisan loyalties of presidents and
representatives at all levels of government. See id.
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hopes for a promotion and increased responsibility, these legislators want
leadership positions.
Given the current structure, the majority party's leadership generally
has the most say concerning appointments to leadership positions.When a
leadership position is reserved for a member of the minority party, in
most cases, the minority party's leadership doles it out. In this way, each
party controls the promotional opportunities of its members. As described
earlier, loyalty to the party is the easiest way to get a leadership promo-
tion, and disobedience can quickly lead to a demotion under most
systems. 8
If the legislators do not follow the party leadership's instructions, in
many cases, they may face a difficult primary in the next election: "Even if
they represent districts that are considered statistically safe, they can be
challenged from within their own party in a primary."69 With the state
party leadership backing another candidate, legislators may lose an oppor-
tunity for re-election.
Finally, state parties commonly use state legislatures as recruiting
grounds for federal offices." A simple examination of current United
States Representatives' and Senators' biographies reveals this. 1 A legislator
who understands his partisan role is more likely to be identified as a loyal
partisan worthy of support for higher office. As many legislators hope to
rise to higher political office, ambitious state legislators have a strong rea-
son to support the party line and vote with party leadership.
F Partisan Staff
Legislators lack knowledge about many of the issues on which they
vote. 2 Most legislators do not have large full time staffs to help them re-
search policy proposals or understand complex legislation. For this reason,
many legislators rely on partisan staff and lobbyists to help them deter-
mine positions. In a poll of legislators who served in their respective
legislatures for more than fifteen years, 3 43% said that the influence of
partisan staff increased during their tenure.74 Additionally, 50.9% of the
68. See James M. Snyder & Tim Groseclose, Estimating Party Influence in Congressional
Roll-Call Voting, 44 AM.J. POL. Sci. 194 (2000).
69. Rosenthal, Is the Party Over?, supra note 21, at 5.
70. See B. Dean Bowles, Local Government Participation as a Route of Recruitment to the
State Legislature in California and Pennsylvania, 1900-1962,19 W POL. Q. 491 (1966).
71. See id.
72. See Christopher Z. Mooney, Information Sources in State Legislative Decision Mak-
ing, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 445 (1991).
73. See Moncrief et al., supra note 11, at 57, 61.
74. Forty-five percent said that their influence had stayed the same, and only 11.9%
said that it had decreased. See id.
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legislators said that the influence of lobbyists had increased since they en-
tered the legislature."
Even with the professionalization of many state legislatures, legisla-
tors still do not spend a large amount of their time on policy analysis. 6 As
a result, legislators sometimes completely lack knowledge about a policy
area on which they vote." Consequently, they will follow the party's posi-
tion as determined by partisan staff.
G. Partisanship at the State Level
Partisanship is a strong force at the state level for two main reasons.
First, because of the professionalization and institutionalization of state
legislatures, ambitious career politicians who rely on their elected office
for income focus their legislating efforts on moving up the party ranks
and receiving "promotions" within the institution. To secure their party's
nomination, a legislator must remain a loyal partisan. Second, legislators
today lack knowledge of many of the issues on which they vote. They rely
on partisan staffi and the leadership to help them determine positions on
key legislation.
II.THE PARTISAN NATURE OF Ex-FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
The development of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws can be un-
derstood only through an examination of state politics in the twenty-first
century. As noted earlier, any changes to ex-offender voter eligibility will
75. Thirty-six and six tenths percent said that their influence had stayed the same,
and only 12.5% said that it had decreased. See id.
76. See id. at 64 (finding that only 13.9% of legislators surveyed disagreed with the
statement that "[ilegislators are more likely today to give a higher priority to their reelec-
tion than to legislative matters").
77. In Spring 2001, a research group I worked with at Cornell University com-
pleted a survey of Pennsylvania state senators on the privatization of prisons. See generally
Jason Conn & Paul Flaharty Policy Paper on the Partisan Politics of Privatization of Prisons in
Pennsylvania (2001) (unpublished undergraduate paper, Cornell University) (on file with
author). By electronic mail, we contacted the Pennsylvania state senators and asked them
to provide their position on the privatization of Pennsylvania's prison system. Many state
senators from this professionalized chamber knew very little about prison policy or priva-
tization. Id. Although the privatization of prisons would impact thousands of prisoner's
lives, alter areas of the state budget significantly, and hand over incarceration duties to a
private entity for the first time in the state's history, state senators knew few details. Despite
an overall lack of knowledge on the subject, almost all state senators voted on the legisla-
tion. The support for privatization was split strictly down partisan lines: Republicans
supported privatization; Democrats did not. Id.
[VOL. 10:495
Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
most likely originate at the state level. Therefore the institutionalization,
ideological differences, and partisanship evident in state government today
play a significant role in determining whether an ex-offender may vote in
a certain state.
The debate at the state level over ex-felon disenfranchisement laws
remains partisan for three reasons. First, allowing ex-felons to vote will
change the partisan makeup of the electorate in ways that will aid De-
mocrats. Second, criminal justice policy and being viewed as "tough on
crime" have become a central part of many legislative campaigns. Third,
the organizations that lobby on each side of the debate over felon disen-
franchisement laws have clear ties to the political parties.
A. Changing the Makeup of the Electorate
When debating felon disenfranchisement laws, the conversations are
intensely political because repealing them would change the makeup of
the electorate. State politicians consider the number of people that will
enter the electoral process in their states should the laws change.7" Politi-
cally, they assess how they expect those ex-offenders will vote in the next
election, or if they will vote at all.
Because voters in state elections tend to vote strictly based on party,
the party registration of the potential electorate is a significant factor that
party leadership must consider when developing a position. Jeff Manza
and Christopher Uggen examined the likely voting decisions that ex-
offenders would make given the opportunity to vote." They used
National Election Studies data to pair the demographic characteristics of
the felon population with matching demographic groups in the general
population."0 Manza and Uggen found that ex-felons would overwhelm-
ingly support Democratic candidates and register as Democrats if given
the option." This seems obvious when one considers that three social
groups that have traditionally supported the Democratic Party are over-
represented in the prison population: Blacks, those without a high school
78. It is estimated by Demos, a political action group working to restore felon voter
eligibility, that 4,653,587 Americans were disenfranchised by felon disenfranchisement
laws in the 2000 election, and about 1,609,710 of the disenfranchised are ex-felons who
have completed their sentences and are back in their respective communities. See Demos,
Restoring Voting Rights to Citizens with Felony Convictions (Vinter 2003-04), available at
http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/FD_-_Toolkit.lr.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). How-
ever, because the laws vary between states, certain states have a larger number of the
disenfranchised population.
79. Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Democratic Contraction? The Political Conse-
quences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. R-av. 777 (2002).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 794.
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degree, and low-income earners.82 Democrats would gain a significant
number of potential voters at the state level if legislation that enfranchises
ex-felons passes.
Data suggest that had felons been allowed to vote in the 2000 elec-
tion, the partisan makeup of the United States Senate would be different
and President George W Bush would have lost to former Vice President
Al Gore in Florida by a 60,000 vote margin. 3 In addition, control of en-
tire state legislatures in certain states would be different had felons or ex-
felons been allowed to vote.8" In other words, the political stakes are high
in debates over ex-felon disenfranchisement laws.
B. Party Platforms and Issue Framing
Equally pertinent as the development of state legislatures is the
development of party positions on issues relating to ex-felon
disenfranchisement laws. Politically, ex-felon disenfranchisement laws are
often discussed today within the context of two issues: civil rights policy
and "tough on crime" policy. Democrats are often associated with policies
related to civil rights5 and Republicans are often touted as the "tough on
crime" party 6 These traditional political stances guide the votes of
Democrats and Republicans on ex-felon disenfranchisement legislation
and helped to create a partisan divide on this issue.
82. Ninety percent of Blacks, 58% of those without a high school degree, and 57%
of low income earners supported Gore in 2000. See Christopher Uggen et a]., Public Atti-
tudes Towards Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States (Paper presented at the National
Symposium on Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, Sept. 30, 2002).
83. It is worth noting that even Manza and Uggen suggest that 60,000 may be too
high a number. See Manza & Uggen, supra note 79, at 792. But they point out that even if
their estimates are off by half, Gore still would have won by a comfortable 30,000 vote
margin. Id. In fact, even if they were off by 59,000 votes, Gore would still have won. See
id. But see Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 85,
122 (2004) (suggesting that "the conventional wisdom that disenfranchisement depresses
state-level voter turnout is incorrect" and criticizing the methodology used in previous
studies).
84. See Manza & Uggen, supra note 79, at 796.
85. See Robert S. Erikson, The Relationship Between Party Control and Civil Rights
Legislation in the American States, 24 W PoL. Q. 178 (1971) (finding that "there were more
civil rights enactments when the Democrats were in power"); see also Mary Alice Nye, The
US. Senate and Civil Rights Roll-Call Votes, 44 W. POL. Q. 971 (1991).
86. Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking Federal Criminal Law: "hat's Law Got to Do with It?
The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 23,40 (1997).
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1. Democrats: Civil Rights
Civil rights often frame discussions of ex-felon disenfranchisement. 7
The right to vote for the representative of one's choice is believed to be a
basic civil right. As the modern Democratic Party consistently associates
with policies that broaden and expand civil rights, supporting ex-felon
voting rights is consistent with the Democratic agenda of the last decade.
Mary Alice Nye examined the two parties' platforms with regard to
civil rights issues and found that in the United States Congress, Democ-
rats supported civil rights legislation thirty percent more often than
Republicans."8 Congressional Democrats consistently supported expand-
ing civil rights, whereas Republicans often did not support such measures
or made decisions individually based on their background.89 Over the last
thirty years, political party has likely influenced roll call votes related to
civil rights more than region, personal income, or education."
2. Republicans:"Tough on Crime"
In today's political atmosphere, being viewed as "tough on crime" is
electorally beneficial." A politician benefits from a perception that he will
make preventing crime and punishing offenders priorities of his term in
office.12 The large number of elected officials who support the death pen-
alty 93 and the strong support for cutting funding to prison educational
programs reflects this perception.94
87. See Elizabeth Simson, Americans for Democratic Action Educ. Fund,justice De-
nied: How Felony Disenfranchisement Laws Undermine American Democracy, at 51 (Mar. 2002),
available at http://www.adaction.org/lizfullpaper.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) ("In both
legal and historical terms, felony disenfranchisement is perhaps most compelling as an issue
of civil rights.... In literature and press releases, the civil rights and voting rights struggles
are commonly invoked by civil rights groups in decrying the effects of felony disenfran-
chisement laws.").
88. Nye, supra note 85, at 984-
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Beale, supra note 86, at 40; see also Dan Schnur, Davis Won by Toeing the GOP
Line: Democratic Candidates Are Using the Conservative Agenda to Win Elections, but Where Does
That Leave Republicans?, L.A.TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B9.
92. Id.
93. See Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Politics and Law and Order, 38 PuB. OPINION Q. 623,
623 (1974-75)-
94. See Abby Ellin, Cons in Class, N.YTIMEs, Aug. 3, 2003, at 28.
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Many politicians believe that by voting and speaking against voter
eligibility for ex-felons they can be viewed as "tough on crime.""5 Repub-
licans have succeeded in campaigning as "tough on crime" candidates, and
they have won elections by painting their Democratic opposition as sym-
pathetic to criminals.
96
Republicans who have supported enfranchising legislation carefully
frame their position by assuring voters that they are tough on criminals.
For example, at his press conference on election law on February 15,
2002, United States Senator Arlen Specter, the senior Republican from
Pennsylvania, said:
I believe that once a convicted felon has paid his or her debt to
society that that person ought to be reintegrated into society
and ought to have the right to vote. Now most of my profes-
sional career, a good part of it was as a prosecuting attorney, I
was D.A. of Philadelphia, prosecuted some 30,000 cases a year,
500 homicides, had 165 assistants. And I believe in tough sen-
tences for tough criminals. But once a person has paid their debt
to society, I believe we ought to bring them back to society as
law abiding citizens. I have been an advocate of life sentences
for career criminals, throw away the book. But once they get
out ofjail, I believe in realistic rehabilitation, job training, liter-
acy training, and I believe that recognition of the right to vote
and the responsibilities of citizenship are a part of that.97
Senator Specter responded to questions about his position on ex-
felon voter eligibility after he was one of only three Republicans to sup-
port Senate Amendment 2879 to Senate Bill 565, the "Martin Luther
King, Jr. Equal Protection of Voting Rights Act of 2002," which was to
"secure the Federal voting rights of certain qualified persons who have
served their sentences.""5 Although only asked to explain why he sup-
ported the measure, in his response, Senator Specter felt it necessary to
provide substantial evidence of his support of "tough on crime" policies.
Democrats try to turn felon disenfranchisement laws into a civil rights
95. See Daniel S. Goldman, Note, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfran-
chisenent and Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. REv. 611, 627-28 (2004) (linking felon
disenfranchisement with other "tough on crime" policies).
96. See Erskine, supra note 93.
97. Senator Arlen Specter, Weekly News Conference, Senate Republican Conference,
Radio Media Center (Feb. 15, 2002), available at http://www.src.senate.gov/public/_files/
radio/newsconferencespecter2-15.mp3 (quote transcribed by author from audio press con-
ference file).
98. Amendment to Senate Bill 565, S.Amdt. 2879, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
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issue, and Republicans frame it as a "tough on crime" issue; this difference
intensifies the partisan debate.
C. Lobbyists and Activists
The third reason ex-felon disenfranchisement laws have become
such a partisan issue is the influence of interest groups on both sides of
the debate. Traditionally liberal and Democratic organizations tend to
support enfranchising ex-felons" More conservative groups have sup-
ported disenfranchisement.' ° Legislators try to please the interest groups
that support their party by following their party's position.
Many civil rights and voting rights organizations lobby legislators on
laws concerning ex-felon disenfranchisement."' These organizations have
strong ties to the Democratic Party. The NAACP, ACLU, AFL-CIO,
People for the American Way, Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and National
Organization for Rehabilitative Offenders, among others, initiate
lobbying efforts around the country on behalf of ex-felons'2 Whereas
most ex-felons cannot afford to contribute to campaigns and do not have
experience lobbying legislative bodies, these political interest groups can
contribute substantial funds to candidates and parties, exerting significant
influence over the legislative process.
For example, in Delaware, the AFL-CIO was a powerful organizing
force."3 Because labor unions are influential in the state, support for ex-
felon voting rights by the labor unions was an important component of
the movement for enfranchisement in that state.' °4 The unions helped by
educating their members, and this action helped build support for legisla-
tive change.0 This support translated into political pressure on legislators,
who ultimately changed the law.
Democratic legislators feel lobbying pressure from many powerful
organizations.0 6 Although no significant national organizations lobby in
99. See Goldman, supra note 95, at 652.
100. id.
101. Telephone Interview with Marvin L. "Doc" Cheatham, Sr., President, Baltimore
City Board of Elections (Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Marvin
Cheatham].
102. Congressional Black Caucus Hearings: Election Reform, Official Web Site of Congress-
woman Eddie Bernice Johnson (Apr. 4, 2001), at http://www.house.gov/ebjohnson/
lstreforml.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
103. Telephone Interview with Janet Leban, Executive Director, Delaware Center for
Justice (Mar. 26,2003) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Janet Leban].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Simson, supra note 87, at 34-45.
SPRING, 2005]
516 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VoL. 10:495
support of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws, corrections officers, police
officers, and prosecuting attorneys tend to oppose giving the right to vote
to ex-felons °7 All three of these groups traditionally hold significant po-
litical weight with the Republican Party; these groups are politically
connected and have the ability to make influential public statements.
Furthermore, since many organizations traditionally associated with
the Democratic Party vocally support ex-felon voter eligibility, Republi-
cans have less of an incentive to support legislative changes. Some
Republicans may even oppose the changes because their opposition's
supporters lobby for them.
1II. PARTISAN CHANGES: CONNECTICUT, MARYLAND,
AND NEW MEXICO
Much of the evidence provided thus far has focused on general
party analysis and political trends. A more concentrated examination of
the politics of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws at the state level shows
that partisanship has a strong practical impact on our laws.
The remainder of this Note will examine the political developments
that led to changes to the laws governing ex-felon voter eligibility in five
states that changed their laws between 2000 and 2002. These five cases
clearly show that partisan politics play a major role in legislative changes
to these laws.
A. Connecticut
On May 4, 2001, Republican Governor John Rowland of Con-
necticut signed his state's House Bill 5042 into law, making it Public Act
01-11: "To restore voting rights to individuals who have been convicted
of a felony and are on probation."'' 5 House Bill 5042 passed the House of
107. Telephone Interview with Marvin Cheatham, supra note 101.
108. According to the bill's Summary:
With one exception, this act enables felons on probation to vote and run for
public office. It does so by limiting a person's disenfranchisement to the period
during which he is committed to (1) the Department of Correction (DOC)
confinement in a correctional institution, facility, or community residence or
placed on parole; (2) a federal prison; or (3) the custody of the chief correc-
tional official of another state or county of another state. A person who is
released from prison after serving time for an elections-related felony convic-
tion cannot get his rights back until he is discharged from parole or probation.
The act requires the DOC commissioner, instead of the Judicial Department,
to send the secretary of the state lists of felons whose voting rights should be
forfeited and those eligible to have their rights restored. It establishes a new
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Representatives on April 11, 2001, by a margin of 80 to 63.'°  It passed
the Senate 22 to 14 on April 25,2001."0
1. Background
In modern times, Connecticut has been a restrictive state in terms of
ex-felon voting rights.111 Prior to legislative changes in 2001, Connecticut
had allowed ex-felons to vote for twenty-five years but had disenfran-
chised felons on probation, parole, and in prison. 12 In 1999, Democratic
State Representative Kenneth P. Green, a former chair of Connecticut's
Legislative Black and Puerto Rican Caucus, attempted to introduce a bill
that would grant voting rights to those felons on probation.' House
leadership blocked his attempts, so Representative Green attached a vot-
ing rights bill to a public financing bill."' Although the measure failed,
Representative Green succeeded in bringing the issue to the floor of the
House for the first time. He said, "When you have people in the commu-
nity, working, paying taxes, they should have the right to vote. You're
talking about taxation without representation. This is just as important in
opening up the political process as other bills to empower our citizens.''15
With the attention he received from his attempts in 1999, Representative
Green formed a coalition to prepare for legislative action in 2000.
In April 2000, Representative Green introduced H.B. 5701, trying
again to reinstate voting rights to those felons on probation."6 Working as
the voice for the newly established Connecticut Voting Rights Restoration
procedure for restoring the voting rights of felons who were confined to the
commissioner's custody. It requires the Office of Adult Probation to use
available appropriations to inform people on probation on January 1, 2002 of
their right to become voters and of the new restoration procedures.
An Act Restoring Voting Rights of Convicted Felons Who Are on Probation, H.B. 5042,
Gen.Assem., 2001 Sess. (Conn. 2001), at 2001HB-05042-R00-CBS.
109. See infra p. 520 tbl.3.3.
110. Id.
111. See Darryl McMiller, DemocracyWorks, The Right to Vote: The Campaign to Re-
store the Voting Rights of Persons Convicted of a Felony and Sentenced to Probation in Connecticut
(2004), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/dw-rtv-ct.pdf (last visited Mar.
29,2005).
112. See id.
113. See Michael Coyle, State-based Advocacy on Felony Disefranchisement, The Sen-
tencing Project, at 4 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/
5083.pdf (last visited Mar- 29, 2005)-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. An Act Concerning the Forfeiture of Electoral Rights and Privileges, H.B. 5701,
Gen. Assein., 2000 Sess. (Conn. 2000), at 2000HB-05701 -R00-CBS.
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Coalition ("CVRRC"), 7 Representative Green garnered significant sup-
port for the bill. DemocracyWorks heads the CVRRC, which consists of
over 40 organizations, including the ACLU, NAACP, Connecticut Citizen
Action Group, Common Cause, church groups, and social service agen-
cies. " 8 Capitalizing on the political clout of coalition members, H.B. 5701
eventually passed in the House but failed in the Senate. " 9
A year later, after concentrating on lobbying legislators, a statewide
media campaign, public education, and outreach, Representative Green
and the CVRRC garnered enough support for the passage of the legisla-
tion through the House and Senate. In April 2001, H.B. 5042 passed, and
as ofJanuary 1, 2002, over 37,000 convicted felons on probation regained




Although the DemocracyWorks web site stated that H.B. 5042
passed with bipartisan support, this statement is probably just an attempt
by the organization to appear non-partisan as it continues to pursue legis-
lative changes in Connecticut. 12' A closer examination of the politics that
led to the restoration of voting rights to probationers reveals a partisan
battle with a roll call vote that was anything but bipartisan.
In 2001, Connecticut had a Republican governor, John Rowland,
but the Democratic Party dominated the House and held a small majority
in the Senate. In all of the roll call votes between 1999 and 2001, the Re-
publicans overwhelmingly opposed granting probationers the right to
vote. Many Republicans believed that granting voting rights to proba-
tioners diminished their punishment; for example, Republican Senator
John McKinney opposed the bill in 2001, stating "we're not just giving
back voting rights, but also lessening the punishment.""'2 Republican
leadership also made the caucus position clear, as Senate Minority Leader
117. Kenneth Green, Description of the Voting Rights Restoration Coalition,
DemocracyWorks, at http://vww.democracyworksct.org/votingrightsrestoration.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005) ("The Connecticut Voting Rights Restoration Coalition, organized by
DemocracyWorks, led the campaign to encourage voting by more than 36,000 Connecticut
residents on probation that previously lost their right to vote due to a felony conviction.").
118. See id.; Coyle, supra note 113, at 4.
119. Conn. H.B. 5701.
120. Gregory B. Hladky, Senate OKs Bill on Felons' Voting Rights, NEw HAVEN R EG.,
Apr. 26,2001.
121. For more information on CVRRC, see DemocracyWorks, Voting Rights
Restoration, at http://www.democracyworksct.org/votingrightsrestoration.htm (last visited
Mar. 29, 2005).
122. Hladky, supra note 120.
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Louis C. Deluca opposed the bill in the press and then attempted to push
through an amendment that would have added additional exemptions for
certain crimes, thus altering the purpose of H.B. 5042.123
TABLE 3.2
CONNECTICUT STATE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2001-02124
TOTAL MEMBERS DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN
HOUSE 151 100 51
SENATE 36 21 15
Senate Democrats feared looking "soft on crime" and many sup-
ported the amendment:
[T]he GOP proposal appeared to have been approved when
Sen. Eileen M. Daily, D-Westbrook, voted in support of the
Republican amendment. That resulted in an 18-18 tie. Under
the Senate rules, Republican Lt. Gov. M. Jodi Rell used her
power as presiding officer to break the tie, voting in support of
the GOP plan.121
In a fascinating political development, Democratic leaders convinced
Senator Daily to change her vote on the amendment before time expired,
thus defeating the amendment.'26 Senator Daily chose to go along with
party interests, even if it was not her first instinct to do so.
123. Id. ("Republican lawmsakers almost succeeded in adding a[n] ... exemption for
felons convicted of such serious crimes as sexual assault or criminal use of a firearm, but the
idea was rejected after two votes.").
124. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Vote 2000: Connecticut Election Pro-
file, at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/profile.cfrnyearsel=2000&statesel=CT (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
125. Hladky, supra note 120.
126. Id,
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TABLE 3.3
s.H.B. 5042 BY PARTY127
NO VOTE/ DEMOCRAT DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN REPUBLICAN
EXCUSED YES No YES NO
HOUSE 80 63 8 72 22 8 41
SENATE 22 14 0 19 2 3 12
House Bill 5042, without the Republican amendment, passed the
House and Senate. All of the sponsors of the bill were Democrats.128 Over
86% of the legislators chose to vote their prescribed party position on this
bill, evidencing a strong connection between party and position on the leg-
islation.
B. Maryland
On May 6, 2002, Democratic Governor Parris Glendening of Mary-
land signed House Bill 535 into law, liffing Maryland's lifetime ban on felon
voter eligibility.1 29 House Bill 535 passed the House of Delegates on April 5,
2002, by a margin of 84 to 49.130 The Senate's sibling bill, Senate Bill 184,
passed by a margin of 26 to 20 on April 2, 2002.1
127. An Act RestoringVoting Rights of Convicted Felons Who Are on Probation, H.B.
5042, Gen. Assem., 2001 Sess. (Conn. 2001), at 2001HB-05042-00-CBS. Because the
number was the same in both chambers, but the bill was introduced in the House, the desig-
nation "s.H.B." precedes the bill number.
128. See id.
129. See NAACP National Voter Fund, Empowerment 2002 Summary: Ex-Felon
Voter Re-enfranchisetnent (May 1,2003), at http://www.naacpnvf.org/c-emp2002sum.php (last
visited Mar. 29,2005).
130. According to the bill's fiscal note:
This bill restores the voting rights of an individual who has been convicted
more than once of theft, or other infamous crimes, provided that three years
have elapsed since the completion of a court-ordered sentence imposed for
conviction including probation, parole, conununity service, restitution, and
fines. An individual convicted of a second or subsequent violent crime is per-
manendy disqualified from registering to vote. The bill is effective January 1,
2003.
An Act Concerning Election LawVoting Rights, Felons, Fiscal Note, S.B. 184, Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess- (Md. 2002) [hereinafter Fiscal Note, S.B. 184 (Md.)], available at http://
nlis.state.md.us/PDF-Documents/ 2002rs/fnotes/bil 0004/sb0184.pdf.
131. S.B. 184, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/
2002rs/billfile/SBO184.htm.
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1. Background
Maryland has a history of conservatism, especially when it comes to
voting rights. Activists point to the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment,
which guarantees that the right to vote would not be denied or abridged
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 32 was rati-
fied by the United States Congress in 1870 but was not ratified by
Maryland until 1973.' Similarly, Maryland did not ratify the Nineteenth
Amendment-"the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude ' 34-until 1941, twenty
years after it was ratified by the United States Congress.
Despite this conservative history, activists at the end of the twentieth
century hoped the strength of the Democratic Party in Maryland
provided an opportunity to make legislative change. In the late 1990s,
numerous attempts to change the laws governing ex-felon disenfran-
chisement all failed.' 3s No single organization pushing for ex-felon voting
rights had enough political power within the state to win in the
legislature.
The process that led to legislative changes in Maryland mirrors the
process in Connecticut. This should not come as a surprise, as the coali-
tion in Maryland modeled its campaign after the ongoing campaign in
Connecticut, right down to its name.'36 In October 2001, under the lead-
ership of Marvin L. "Doc" Cheatham, Sr., the president of the Baltimore
City Board of Elections, a coalition of organizations supporting the resto-
ration of voting rights to ex-felons was convened.'37 Mr. Cheatham
believed that there needed to be a large coalition that had the political
132. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
133. Telephone Interview with Marvin Cheatham, supra note 101.
134. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX.
135. Senate Bill 184's fiscal note summarizes previous attempts to enact legislation:
Prior Introductions: SB 83, introduced in the 2001 session was nearly identi-
cal, and was unfavorably reported from the Senate Economic and
Environmental Affairs Committee. HB 438 of the 2000 session would have
allowed felons to register to vote upon completion of a five-year period after
serving a sentence for an infamous crime beyond the first offense. Also, HB
25 in the 1999 session would have allowed felons to vote after completing
probation, with no five-year waiting period. Both HB 438 and 14B 25 re-
ceived an unfavorable report from the Commerce and Government Matters
Committee.
Fiscal Note, S.B. 184 (Md.), supra note 130.
136. Telephone Interview with Marvin Cheatham, supra note 101.
137. See Coyle, supra note 113, at 8.
522 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 10:495
clout to press legislators. "8 The Maryland Voting Rights Restoration Coa-
lition ("MVRRC") was formed with support from over fifty
organizations from across Maryland and the nation. Most notably, it in-
cluded the NAACP, ACLU, and League of Women Voters. The coalition
eventually succeeded in its effort to change the felon disenfranchisement
laws, but not without a significant political battle.
The coalition's first success came at the end of 2001. In response to
inquiries by state legislators working with the MVRRC, Chapter 481
(H.B. 495) was enacted "to establish a Task Force to study repealing the
disenfranchisement of convicted felons in Maryland."' 9 Although the task
force's report did not contain any specific recommendations, the release of
the report was the first time that many voters in Maryland, and even
Maryland's legislators, became aware that Maryland had some of the most
stringent voter eligibility laws in the nation. 4 '
The release of the task force's report brought about the introduction
of two matching bills to eliminate Maryland's ex-felon disenfranchise-
ment laws: Democratic Delegate Kerry Hill introduced H.B. 535, and
Democratic Senator Delores Kelly introduced S.B. 184.41 A significant
amount of lobbying by MVRRC followed that included using ex-felons
as lobbyists. 142 In addition, in an attempt to ensure the passage of the legis-
lation, a compromise was made with Republicans through the inclusion
of a three-year waiting period. The bills eventually both passed. The legis-
lation went into effect on January 1, 2003,' and enfranchised about
60,000 ex-offenders.
According to a recent report released by The Sentencing Project,
Mr. Cheatham views "the success of the coalition as due to its organiza-
tion and the efforts that went into realizing all aspects of the campaign:
rallies, posters, mailings, flyers, and other media."' 44 Although there is no
doubt that MVRRC's grassroots efforts served as the catalyst for the pas-
sage of H.B. 535 and S.B. 184, a political analysis reveals that partisan
forces, in combination with Democratic control of the legislature, deter-
mined the fate of the bills in the legislature.
138. Id. at 8-9.
139. Fiscal Note, S.B. 184 (Md.), supra note 130.
140. Telephone Interview with Marvin Cheatham, supra note 101.
141. Coyle, supra note 113, at 8.
142. Telephone Interview with Marvin Cheatham, supra note 101.
143. Margie Hyslop, Special Report: Right to Vote?, WAsH.TIMis,July 14,2002, at Al.
144. Coyle, supra note 113, at 9.
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2. Partisan Politics
Democrats controlled both the Senate and House in Maryland dur-
ing the 2001-02 session, and its governor, Parris Glendening, was also a
Democrat. "' The Maryland case demonstrates the partisan nature of the
laws.
TABLE 3.4
MARYLAND STATE LEGISLATURE 2OOI02146
TOTAL MEMBERS DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN
HOUSE 141 106 35
SENATE 47 34 13
Democrats in Maryland strongly supported the legislative changes,
while Republicans were in public opposition. 4 1 Senator Timothy R.
Ferguson, a Maryland Republican, argued that "certain people should
never stop paying for their sins, even if between them and their Maker the
slate is clean."' 8 Most Maryland Democrats did not share this viewpoint:
"Senator Ulysses Currie, Prince George's County Democrat said ...
'There are 50,000 kids whose fathers and mothers are in (Maryland] insti-
tutions.... [I]f any of those guys come out, you'd want them to assume
responsibilities for their lives and their kids.Voting is part of that responsi-
bility.'"9 Only one Republican senator publicly supported S.B. 184, and
she was a moderate who came from a district with a particularly high
Democratic registration."
Although the MVRRC targeted Republican support for the legisla-
tion, Republicans remained aware of the potential harm that ex-felons
could have on their electoral chances."' Many Republicans attributed the
electoral success of former Mayor Marion Barry of nearby Washington
D.C. to his courting of the ex-felon vote after his misdemeanor cocaine-
possession conviction.12 In addition, granting voting rights to ex-felons
145. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Vote 2000: Maryland Election Profile,
at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/profile.cfin?yearsel=2000&statesel=MD (last visited
Mar. 29,2005).
146. Id.
147. See Coyle, supra note 113, at 8-9.
148. Hyslop, supra note 143, at Al.
149. Id.




Michigan Journal of Race & Law
would increase the political power of Baltimore, a Democratic stronghold.
Maryland Secretary of State John Willis declared at a rally for ex-felon
voting rights: "We're talking about another 50,000 to 60,000 people in
the city [of Baltimore] that could help hold on to the city's political
power."' 53 In Maryland, it was generally recognized that the political im-
pact of ex-offender's votes could further entrench Democrats in power.
The MVRRC additionally found some opposition among Democ-
rats. Despite the evident electoral gains that the legislation would bring
Democrats, some feared that they would be painted as "soft on crime" in
the upcoming election.'54 The coalition's greatest successes probably came
from convincing Senate Democrats to vote for S.B. 184. Powerful interest
groups launched a groundswell of lobbying for the legislation, and even-
tually Democrats that were on the fence decided to support the
legislation. '
When the bills were voted on in April 2002, the legislation passed
overwhelmingly in the House and squeaked through in the Senate. As
Table 3.5 shows, the votes were almost strictly partisan. Over 87% of the
legislators voted their prescribed party position. It is also worth noting
that the sponsors and co-sponsors of the legislation were Democrats.
TABLE 3.5
H.B. 535 AND S.B. 184 BY PARTY'
5 6
No VOTE/ DEMOCRAT DEMOCRAT REPUBUCAN REPUBLICAN
YES No EXCUSED YES No YES No
HOUSE 84 49 8 84 14 0 35
BILL 535
SENATE 26 20 1 25 8 1 12
BILL 184
Based on these votes, Maryland shows a clear example of the parti-
san nature of ex-felon disenfranchisement legislation.
153. Id.
154. See Coyle, supra note 113, at 9.
155. Id.





On March 15, 2001, Republican Governor Gary Johnson of New
Mexico signed Senate Bill 204 into law, "restoring the right to vote to a
person convicted of a felony who has satisfied all conditions of a sen-
tence." '' 7 Senate Bill 204 passed the Senate on March 2, 2001, 25 to 17.118 It
passed the House of Representatives on March 10, 2001, by a margin of 39
to 20.119
1. Background
New Mexico was among the states with the most restrictive laws
throughout the twentieth century. Senate Bill 204 was the first change to
New Mexico's felon disenfranchisement laws since 1911.16o Senate Presi-
dent Richard Romero, a Democrat from Albuquerque, introduced Senate
Bill 204.161
The legislative process in New Mexico involved less complexity than
in Connecticut or Maryland. Although some national organizations lobbied
for changes to the New Mexico disenfranchisement laws, the action in
New Mexico was largely a response to the 2000 election and changes to
felon disenfranchisement laws taking place elsewhere in the country.
In the aftermath of the 2000 election, it is easy to forget that the
closeness of the vote between Gore and Bush in New Mexico rivaled that
of Florida.62 With the final count completed and all of the challenges ex-
hausted, Gore won New Mexico by less than 400 votes. 163 Although Florida
became the focus of the election controversies because of its role in decid-
ing the Electoral College, and thus the presidency, New Mexico found itself
equally plagued with issues of election administration. Senator Romero
capitalized on the attention being given to election reform, and as a result,
New Mexico's legislature began examining its election laws, including ex-
felon disenfranchisement laws.
157. RestoreVoting Rights, S.B. 204,47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2001).
158. See infra p. 526 tbl.3.7.
159. Id.
160. See Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the "Menace of Negro Domina-
tion": Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J.
Soc. 559,565 (2003) (showing that New Mexico enacted its first felon disenfranchisement
law even before gaining statehood).
161. Donovan Kabalka, Felons Might Be Able to Vote Again, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., June
29, 2001, atA2.
162. See DouGLAs KELLNER, GRAND THEFT 2000: MEDIA SPECTACLE AND STOLEN
ELECTION 47 (2001).
163. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2000: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2001).
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TABLE 3.6
NEw MEXICO STATE LEGISLATURE 2001-0264
TOTAL DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN
MEMBERS
HOUSE 70 42 28
SENATE 42 24 18
Like Connecticut and Maryland, Democrats dominated the New
Mexico legislature. In addition, New Mexico's Republican Governor Gary
Johnson, known as a progressive Republican, often supported social policies
traditionally associated with liberals. 6 In 1999, he even called for an end to
the "War on Drugs:' traditionally a major part of the Republican plat-
form. 6 All in all, the political pieces were in place for S.B. 204.
2. Partisan Politics
The votes on Senate Bill 204 in New Mexico show the strength of
the support for reform within the Democratic Party. As seen in Table 3.7,
not a single Democrat voted against S.B. 204 in the Senate.
TABLE 3.7
S.B. 204 BY PARTY '67
NO VOTE/ DEMOCRAT DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN REPUBLICANYES NO
EXCUSED YES NO YES NO
HOUSE 39 20 9 32 2 7 18
SENATE 25 17 0 24 0 1 17
164. National Conference of State Legislatures, StateVote 2000: New Mexico Election
Profile, at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/profile.cfin?yearsel=2000&statesel=NM (last
visited Mar. 29,2005).
165. See Jeff Zeleny, Governor jogs Solo on Drug Issue; New Mexico's Johnson Sees US.
Failure, Hypocrisy, CHI.TRIB.,Aug. 8, 2001, at 8.
166. See id.
167. Restore Voting Rights, S.B. 204, 47th Leg., keg. Sess. (N.M. 2001), at http://
legis.state.nm.us/cs/_session.asp?chamber=S&type=+ +&nurnber= 204&year=01.
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Many New Mexico Republicans recognized that the enfranchisement
of New Mexico's ex-felon population would potentially increase the num-
ber of Democrats in the state. In an interview with the Albuquerque Tribune,
State Republican Party Chairman John Dendahl noted that "he worried
those eligible under the bill would register with the Democratic Party.16
However, Dendahl later decided that he would follow Governor Johnson's
lead and support the legislation: "When people have served their time, all of
it, it's very hard for me intellectually to say that person should not be re-
stored to full citizenship. So, I supported it " '5 9 Although some Republican
leaders like Dendahl and Governor Johnson supported the legislation, most
Republicans opposed the measure in the roll call vote, as shown in Table
3.7.
Hispanics, a group that strongly identifies with Democratic candidates,
constitute over 60% of the New Mexico prison population.'°7 New Mexico
Republicans were concerned about the political impact of enfranchising
such a large Hispanic population. At the same time, the makeup of this
group gave Democrats an electoral incentive to support the legislation.
Most legislators voted along party lines. An astounding 90% of legisla-
tors who voted on the bill voted with their parry's prescribed position,
1 7
,
providing more evidence of partisan influence on felon disenfranchisement
legislation.
IV EXPANDING TIlE ARGUMENT: MASSACHUSETTS AND DELAWARE
A. Massachusetts: The Democratic Threshold
On June 28, 2000, legislators from the House and Senate in Massa-
chusetts held a joint session to convene a constitutional convention.1 72 At
the convention, the General Court voted 155 to 45 to put a Legislative
Constitutional Amendment on the 2000 election ballot in Massachusetts'
to take away the right to vote from all imprisoned felons.1 74 On November
168. Kabalka, supra note 161.
169. Id.
170. FairVote, Voting Rights Update: March 23, 2001, at http://wwwfairvote.org/vra/
march23.htm (last visited Mar. 29,2005).
171. See supra p. 526 tbl.3.7.
172. Michael Crowley, Lawmakers Favor Ban of Felons' Voting Rights, BOSTON GLoBE, June
29, 2000, at B3.
173. A "Legislative Constitutional Amendment" requires that a "[m]ajority of ballots
cast on the question must be affirmative." See Elections Division, Secretary of the
Commonwealth, Massachusetts Statewide Ballot Measures: An Overview, at http://
www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/elebalm/balmover.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
174. As of publication, Maine andVermont are the only two states that allow prisoners
to vote. See Demos, About Felon Re-enfranchisement, at http://www.demos-usa.org/
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7, 2000, the Amendment, or Question 2 on the 2000 ballot, passed." 5
Massachusetts voters overwhelmingly passed the Amendment, 1,648,447
(60.3%) to 926,737 (33.9%).176
1. Background
In 1997, Republican Governor Paul Cellucci advocated repealing
voting rights from felons imprisoned in Massachusetts.1 77 In reaction
to Governor Cellucci's statements, prisoners in Massachusetts began
organizing a political action committee. Governor Cellucci shot back by
issuing an executive order that stopped the prisoners from organizing,
muting a potentially strong political voice." The legislature began
discussing felon disenfranchisement in an attempt to resolve the issue in a
more democratic and permanent fashion.
A very public debate on amending the state constitution to ban
prisoner voting began. The proposed constitutional change received a
great deal of support from the public and political organizations. Although
it is estimated that less than 5% of the Massachusetts prison population
voted on a regular basis, legislators hoping to look "tough on crime" ral-
lied behind the legislation. "' Throughout the entire process, Governor
Cellucci remained the most supportive advocate of the amendment.
Even supporters of felon voting rights found little to rally behind.
Democratic Representative Patricia D. Jehlen, who opposed the amend-
ment, noted that only four inmates from the Somerville prison had voted
in the presidential primaries."' The Criminal Justice Policy Coalition in
Boston mounted the strongest opposition to the amendment,""1 but many
of the arguments commonly used in the battle for ex-felon voting rights,
such as "ex-felons are rehabilitated" and "it helps with reintegration," were
page26.cfi (last visited Mar. 11, 2005). It is worth noting that neither state has a significant
minority population in the general public or in the prison population. Further study of this
connection is warranted.
175. According to the Elections Division of Massachusetts, Legislative Constitutional
Amendments have historically passed at a high rate, with a total of 51 of 59 passing in
Massachusetts history, a success rate of 86.44%. See Elections Division, supra note 173.
176. See Elections Division, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Ballot Measure Information
for 2000, at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/lebah/bahnpdf/balm2000.pdf (last visited Mar.
29, 2005). Over 94% of those that voted in the 2000 election chose to vote on Question 2.
Id. Only 158,647 left this question blank, suggesting a low number of undecided voters. Id.
177. Hyslop, supra note 143, at Al.
178. Id.
179. Crowley, supra note 172, at B3.
180. See id.
181. Jack Sullivan, Choices 2000;Answers to Questions, BosToN HERALD, Nov. 5, 2000,
at E07.
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not applicable in the battle for voting rights for imprisoned felons. One of
the Criminal Justice Policy Coalition's strongest arguments in opposition
to the amendment was essentially "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Bolstering
that sentiment, Stephen T. Saloom, director of the Criminal Justice Policy
Coalition said, "[uinless there's a threat to our democracy or the social
fabric we shouldn't amend it. This sets a dangerous precedent for fiddling
with the constitution."'' 2 Ultimately, this argument did not persuade Mas-
sachusetts' voters. In November 2000, the electorate made the first
restrictive change to Massachusetts' voting rights laws in the history of the
state.
2. Politics
The Democratic Party dominates the Massachusetts General Court,
which seems surprising at first glance, given the overwhelming support
for the felon disenfranchisement amendment in the legislature. A majority
of Masschusetts Democrats supported taking away prisoners' right to vote,
which seems inconsistent with the arguments presented earlier in this
Note linking Democrats to the efforts to enfranchise felons.
TABLE 3.8
MASSACHUSETTS STATE LEGISLATURE 2000"83
TOTAL MEMBERS DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN INDEPENDENT
HOUSE 160 132 27 
1
SENATE 40 33 7 0
It is true that Massachusetts Republicans also fiercely supported the
amendment. Republican Representative and House Minority Leader
Francis Marini was one of the leading proponents of the amendment: "The
right to vote is the foundation of our democracy and that foundation needs
to be protected and honored."'84 Ironically, he felt that protecting that foun-
dation required taking away that right from felons. Marini's spokesman
responded at a press conference,"This was not designed to limit the impact
that prisoners have on law-abiding society-but why should they have an
impact?"''8 Republicans were well aware that had a significant number of
182. Id.
183. National Conference of State Legislatures, StateVote 2000: Massachusetts
Pre-Election Profile, at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/profile.cfm?yearsel=2000&
statesel=MA (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
184. Sullivan, supra note 181, at E07.
185. Hyslop, supra note 143, at Al.
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felons voted during the previous gubernatorial election, Governor Cellucci
might have lost the election.'86
Democrats did not use their majority to stop the amendment, and
in a state dominated by Democrats, the voting public approved of the bill.
It appears that Democrats, although more liberal than Republicans, are
still to the political right of a position supporting prisoner voting. The
Maryland effort, according to Mr. Cheatham, had focused on ex-felons
because many Democrats were not ready to discuss voting rights for pris-
oners. 8 Maryland activists feared that including prisoners' voting rights in
their fight for ex-felon voting rights would have jeopardized the entire
movement.' Similarly, former Attorney General Janet Reno stated that
she was not sure of her position on-prisoner voting rights.'89 She believed
that most Democrats were not ready to embrace prisoner voting rights.' 0
It appears that for Massachusetts Democrats, the political risk of voting for
imprisoned convicts' voting rights was significant. That being said,
Democrats in Massachusetts were not vocally supportive of the amend-
ment.The politics of Massachusetts with regard to prisoners' voting rights
mirrored the politics of a similar Utah bill two years earlier.' When the
Utah legislature voted to ban prisoner voter eligibility in 1998, most
Democrats were silent on the bill. However, as Table 3.10 exhibits, the roll
call vote in the Senate was unanimous, and in the House only five legisla-
tors did not support the ban.'92
186. See Joe Sciacca, Tine to Take Voting Rights froni the Cons, BOSTON HERALD, Oct.
16, 2000, at 4.
187. Telephone Interview with Marvin Cheatham, supra note 101.
188. Id.
189. Interview with Janet Reno, former Attorney General of the United States,
Ithaca, N.Y (Feb. 10, 2003).
190. Id.
191. Robert R. Preuhs, State Felon Disenfranchisement Policy, 82 Soc. Scc Q. 733, 736-
37 (2001).
192. Felon Voting Restrictions, H.B. 190, Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 1998), at http://
www.le.state.ut.us/-1998/htmdoc/hbillhtm/HB19S3.htm.
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TABLE 3.9
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE 199819'
TABLE 3.10
UTAH H.B. i90 (1998) T"
Felons do not vote at a high rate while in prison.9 Accordingly,
Democrats do not stand to gain many votes by supporting prisoner voting
rights. From a purely political standpoint, Democrats stand to lose their
more conservative supporters by voting in favor of inmate voting rights,
but they may disappoint their most liberal voting bloc if they vocally sup-
port banning prisoner voting." 6
The Massachusetts case suggests a Democratic threshold when it
comes to felon disenfranchisement laws. Democrats will support allowing
ex-felons to vote but are not willing to support allowing prisoners' suf-
frage. The lack of vocal backing of the amendment on the part of the
Democrats who supported it suggests that they either did not feel strongly
about their position or were concerned about the electoral impact. Either
way, it appears that in Massachusetts, Democrats and Republicans both
played electoral politics when it came to felon disenfranchisement laws.
193. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 1997: ELECTION RESULTS DIREc-
TORY 245 (1997).
194. Utah H.B. 190.
195. Sciacca, supra note 186, at 4.
196. This is similar to the "fine line" which Democrats walk on the issue of gay mar-
riage. Democrats do not want to alienate their liberal voting bloc by opposing gay
marriage, but many more conservative Democrats would be turned off by outright sup-
port of allowing gay marriage. See Patrick Healy, Kerry Aims to Keep Peace with Gays,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2004, at Al (discussing Democratic presidential candidate and
Massachusetts Senator John Kerry's efforts to maintain his base while addressing the gay
marriage issue in the 2004 presidential election).
No VOTE/
YES No EXCUSED
HOUSE 56 5 14
SENATE 27 0 2
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The Massachusetts case provides strong evidence of the influence of
electoral and partisan politics on the process of changing felon disenfran-
chisement laws. It also suggests that the rule that Democrats as a caucus will
always support enfranchisement does not extend to prisoners' voting rights.
B. Delaware:An "Unprofessionalized" Legislature
An amendment to the Delaware State Constitution must receive a
two-thirds majority in the House and Senate in two consecutive General
Assemblies to pass. On June 28, 2000, the Delaware State Senate passed
House Bill 126, 16 to 5, thus amending the Delaware State Constitution' 9
and eliminating the lifetime voting ban for felons. The House of Repre-
sentatives passed House Bill 126 by a margin of 35 to 1 earlier in the
session on May 11, 1999."' As the amendment had been approved in the
previous Assembly, the vote in 2000 was the last "legislative leg" needed to
enact the amendment.
1. Background
Until 2000, Delaware disenfranchised all convicted felons for life.
9'9
Delaware had one of the highest general disenfranchisement rates in the
country, 5.62%, and the laws disqualified 15.71% of the Black vote, 200 or
one in five Black men.
20 1
In 1990, the Delaware Center for Justice formed an alliance to edu-
cate the public about disenfranchisement laws and to lobby the General
Assembly to change the state constitution.0 2 The alliance for the restora-
tion of ex-offenders' voting rights included labor unions, evangelical
Christian churches, Muslim groups, civil rights organizations, and peace
groups." 3 By not solely making arguments based on race and not singling
out Democratic organizations, the Delaware Center for Justice created a
coalition that included a diverse group of organizations.'.2 By appealing to
conservatives and liberals, the alliance reached out to diverse sections of
the population and catered to the interests of legislators from across the
197 See DFi. CONST. art.V, § 2.
198. See infra p. 534 tbl.3.11.
199. Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HAgv. L. REV. 1838, 1948
(2002).
200. Id.
201. Carper Signs Bill Supporting Voting Rights for Most Ex-Felons, AP. STATE & LOCAL
WiR ,June 14, 2000, BC Cycle.
202. See Coyle, supra note 113, at 10.
203. See id. at 7; see also Telephone Interview with Janet Leban, supra note 103.
204. See Coyle, supra note 113, at 6-7.
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political spectrum.2"' According to Janet Leban, executive director of the
Delaware Center for Justice, "we did not leave a stone unturned. Anything
we felt would be reinforcing, we tried it."2 6
Despite significant public support0 7 and a broad coalition, the alli-
ance met strong opposition from a senator who held a key leadership
position. Democratic Senator James Vaughn, chair of the Corrections
Committee, and a former corrections commissioner, strongly opposed
lifting the ban on ex-felon suffrage."' A Senate regulation stipulated that a
bill may not be voted on until the chair of the committee authorizes its
release.20 9 Despite significant political pressure, Senator Vaughn refused to
release the bill.2 °
Finally, a task force met with SenatorVaughn in early 2000. By then,
Senator Vaughn had essentially held up the legislation for close to ten
years.21' During the task force, Senator Vaughn stated publicly that his
main objection to the legislation was that there was no way to monitor
whether or not a felon had paid all of his fines and completed his sen-
tence, and that he would not release the bill from committee until this
point of contention was resolved.212 Although it is likely that Senator
Vaughn had other objections to the legislation, his public declaration pro-
vided an opening to activists. The Delaware Center for Justice, the
elections commissioner, and other key legislators worked to develop a
system to ensure that felons would complete their sentences before being
cleared to vote.2 13 When presented with the plan, SenatorVaughn kept his
word and released the bill.214
Just prior to the passage of the amendment, Senator Margaret Rose
Henry, a Democrat, proposed Senate Bill 350 to create a system to moni-
tor ex-felon registration.2 15 The goal of this bill was to make sure that the
205. See generally Carper Signs Bill Supporting Voting Rights for Most Ex-Felons, supra note
201.
206. Coyle, supra note 113, at 7.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Telephone Interview with Janet Leban, supra note 103.
211. Coyle, supra note 113, at 6.
212. Telephone Interview with Janet Leban, supra note 103.
213. It is worth noting that the law excludes "persons convicted of murder, manslaugh-
ter, sex offenses or violations of the public trust." Coyle, supra note 113, at 6.
214. Telephone Interview with Janet Leban, supra note 103.
215. According to the bill:
If and when a Constitutional Amendment is passed, restoring voting Tights to
felons, this Act would provide a procedure to be utilized: 1) to determine
whether or not a person applying for voter registration has been convicted of a
felony; and 2) if so, whether or not it is a disqualifying felony which would
prohibit approval of such person's application; and 3) if the felony is not a
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system that Senator Vaughn wanted was in place before the Senate voted
on the amendment. Senate Bill 350 passed the House and Senate unani-
mously and paved the way for the amendment.
2 16
The bill passed the Senate, and the constitution was amended to
state "any person who is disqualified as a voter because of a [felony] con-
viction ... shall have such disqualification removed upon being pardoned,
or five years after the expiration of the sentence, whichever may first oc-




The Delaware case stands in stark contrast to the political process
that took place one year later in neighboring Maryland. As described in
Part III.B., Maryland's political process was extremely partisan and com-
plex. The reason Delaware's politics differed from Maryland is likely
because of the differences in professionalization of the legislatures.
The Delaware General Assembly was divided in 2000; Republicans
controlled the House and Democrats controlled the Senate. That being
said, party affiliation was not an important factor in the legislative politics
in Delaware. According to the General Assembly's web site, the legislature
disqualifying felony, whether or not the applicant has been discharged of all
obligations imposed when the applicant was sentenced.
An Act to Amend Title 15 of the Delaware Code Relating to Felon Voting Rights, S.B. 350,
140th Gen. Assem., 2000 Sess. (Del. 2000).
216. See generally Carper Signs Bill Supporting Voting Rights for Most Ex-Felons, supra note
201.
217. Developments in ttle Law--The Law of Prisons, supra note 199, at 1948.
218. An Act Concurring in a Proposed Amendment to Article V, Section 2, of the
Constitution of the State of Delaware, Relating to Qualifications forVoting and Forfeiture




HOUSE 35 1 5
SENATE 16 5 0
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and the legislator positions are part-time.21s The legislature is considered a





DELAWARE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 200221
TOTAL MEMBERS DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN
HOUSE 41 15 26
SENATE 21 13 8
The Delaware case is an example of the way in which a legislature
with no strong party structure and low political stakes will deal with ex-
felon disenfranchisement legislation. The lobbying effort in Delaware was
largely grassroots. In Delaware, if a state legislator receives more than ten
phone calls from constituents, those calls can hold serious weight. 222 The
alliance employed no professional polling company, and activists worked
hard to individually educate voters.
23
The party structure is weak in Delaware, and the national political
stakes were low. With its one congressional seat and three Electoral Col-
lege votes, Delaware's amendment did not draw the same national
attention that Maryland's movement did. Most of the major lobbying
groups involved in the Delaware legislation were local to Delaware, and
there was no strong organized effort from those opposed to the
changes.
224
The General Assembly's vote on House Bill 126 was not an aberra-
tion in Delaware. 225 In fact, the legislature commonly passes bills with
219. State of Delaware, Department of State: Government Information Center; Chapter 3:
The Legislature, at http://www.state.de.us/sos/gic/lwv /body/dgbody-05.shtml (last visited
Mar. 29, 2005).
220. See id.
221, National Conference of State Legislatures, State Vote 2000: Delaware Election
Profile, at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/profile.cfm?yearsel-2000&statese=DE (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
222. Telephone Interview with Janet Leban, supra note 103.
223. Id.
224. Coyle, supra note 113, at 7.
225. Delaware's legislature has often been unaffected by national trends and has
wanted to keep its part-time citizen's legislature. Delaware has also been unaffected by the
partisanship seen at the federal level. Although Delaware was the first state to ratify the
constitution, President Bill Clinton was the first President in United States history to ad-
dress the Delaware legislature, on May 8, 1998. See Richard Benedetto, Education Is a Top
Priority, Right? Just Ask the Voters, USA TODAY, May 11, 1998, at 6A. Clinton's speech on the
roles of the federal and state government when it comes to education could have been
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bipartisan support.2 26 For example, the Delaware State Senate recently
voted unanimously to revamp Delaware's probation system.2 ' The bill,
Senate Bill 50, had two sponsors, a Democrat and a Republican. 228 In
Delaware's unprofessionalized legislature, bipartisan and unanimous votes
are possible, even on bills related to issues as polarizing as criminal justice
policies.
The Delaware case shows that when partisan stakes are particularly
low, the legislative votes will not be constrained by partisan politics. Con-
sistent with the arguments presented in this Note, Delaware demonstrates
that a less professionalized legislature may result in a less politicized and
partisan legislative process with regard to ex-felon disenfranchisement
laws.
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The United States Constitution establishes no guaranteed right to
vote. However, those convicted of felonies are the last remaining group of
American citizens who have been barred from voting. In the majority of
states, ex-felons cannot vote for at least a short period after leaving prison.
In other states, this group of disproportionately Black and Hispanic citi-
zens is disenfranchised indefinitely. Americans celebrate the expansions of
suffrage, such as the Nineteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act,
because we have come to think of the vote as embodying a foundation of
democratic politics. But this analysis of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws
has shown that in the twenty-first century, this fundamental principle can
be qualified by political interests. In state legislatures, where decisions on
whether or not to enfranchise ex-felons are made, partisan interests will
determine whether this last disenfranchised segment of the population
will be given the right to vote.
made in any state legislature in the country, but Clinton selected Delaware because he
wanted to go to a state where he knew he would receive a positive reception from both
Democrats and Republicans. Delaware provided this non-partisan atmosphere. In describ-
ing the Delaware legislature during Clinton's speech, the national press referred to the
legislature as "quaint," "cozy," and "warm." Id.
226. See, e.g., Joe Rogalsky, Delaware Senate Approves Probation Overhaul, newszap.com,






Part I discussed the processes of reorganization, professionalization,
and institutionalization that the state legislatures have gone through in the
past forty years. These processes have created legislatures that attract more
politically savvy legislators. Since most voters vote for the candidate of
their party in state elections, legislators in gerrymandered districts con-
cern themselves with climbing the institutional ladder. Party dedication
and loyalty are paramount and majority parties have control over the pol-
icy decisions of the states. In today's professionalized legislatures, it can be
expected that issues with partisan significance will be decided based on
electoral and political positioning.
Part II focused on the partisan divide between Democrats and Re-
publicans when it comes to voting on legislation related to ex-felon voter
eligibility. Ex-felon disenfranchisement laws have a clear impact on the
outcome of elections in the United States, and this influences legislators'
positions. Changes to ex-felon voter eligibility laws are being made based
on the influence of partisan and electoral politics. Democrats will likely
support a more enfranchising policy, whereas Republicans will almost
always support more restrictive laws.
In Part III, three states-Connecticut, Maryland, and New Mexico-
demonstrate the partisan nature of roll call votes on felon
disenfranchisement legislation and exemplify the political battles that occur
when these laws are discussed in the legislatures. Part IV discussed two
states that appear to be aberrations, Massachusetts and Delaware. The
example of Massachusetts revealed that although Democrats will always
support the more enfranchising policy, they will not go so far as to support
prisoners' voting rights. In Delaware, a state with an unprofessionalized
legislature, felon disenfranchisement laws changed in a generally non-
partisan way.
B. The Race Card?
Given that a disproportionate number of those disenfranchised by
ex-felon voter eligibility laws are minorities, and given the important role
that arguments based on race play in the courts, why is a discussion of
race largely absent from the public political discussions of these laws in
the state legislatures?
In The Race Card,2 9 Tali Mendelberg suggests that race is rarely dis-
cussed explicitly by public officials230 because politicians hide their inner
229. TAI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD (2001).
230. This observation seems obvious. After all, publicly stating that one's decision was
based on race is political suicide in today's politically correct atmosphere. One only has to
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justifications and find other arguments to justify their race-based opin-
ions. 3' Applying Mendelberg's theories to ex-felon disenfranchisement
laws, one might conclude that legislators are merely obscuring the fact
that they are developing their positions on disenfranchisement laws based
on race. But analysis of the recent history of ex-felon disenfranchisement
laws suggests another possibility: that legislators develop their positions
based on a rational assessment of clectoral politics.
In the twenty-first century, partisan commitments that have evolved
over more than a century of racially-divided perspectives infuse race's
connection to party politics. For that reason, it may be impossible to fhlly
disentangle race from political party. But Republicans and Democrats
who oppose ex-felon voting rights are not necessarily taking racist posi-
tions; they are determining their roll call votes based on partisan political
interests. Because of the clear connection between race and party politics,
it is difficult to determine legislators' true motives, but it is important to
recognize that it may not be racial animus but rather race's connection to
party identification that is causing many legislators to vote against elini-
nating felon disenfranchisement laws.
look to the recent events surrounding the resignation of Senator Trent Lott from his
position as Senate Republican leader to see the way in which the public reacts to any
comments explicitly tied to race:
Mr. Lott touched off the furor on Dec. 5 at a 100th-birthday tribute to Sen.
Strom Thurmond, South Carolina Republican, when Mr. Lott said he was
proud Mississippi voted for Mr. Thurmond for president in 1948, when the
South Carolinian ran on the segregationist'Dixiecrat' platform....
Almost immediately, House and Senate Democrats began to call for Mr. Lott
to step down as leader, and for Mr. Bush to publicly rebuke Mr. Lott. Mr.
Bush obliged last week, calling Mr. Lott's remarks 'offensive,: though White
House aides also said the president did not think Mr. Lott should resign.
Stephen Dinan, Lott Resigns Senate Leadership Post; Will Retain His Seat; Frist Set to Succeed
Him, WAsH.TwIEs, Dec. 21,2002, at AO.
231. As Mendelberg notes:
[Riacial stereotypes, fears, and resentments shape our decisions most when
they are least discussed. Racial communication is common, but it is often
presented as if it were not about race at all. It is this strong but implicit refer-
ence to race that is most effective in priming racial predispositions and
racializing the political choices of white citizens .... Thus, the most effective
way to counter a racial message is to render it explicit, to show that it is in
fact racial.
MENDELBERG, supra note 229, at 268.
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C. From the Courts to the Legislatures
This Note suggests that it will soon be time for those who seek
changes to felon disenfranchisement laws to get rid of civil rights attor-
neys and hire political strategists. Whereas the debate over felon
disenfranchisement in the courts has centered on racial impact, funda-
mental rights, and constitutional arguments, the battle in the legislatures
will be based on partisan politics. Because legislatures have become more
professionalized, partisan politics plays a larger role in the workings and
decision-making of the nation's state legislatures, and today's suffragists
seeking to change felon disenfranchisement policy will face different
types of partisan political obstacles than suffragists of past movements to
expand the electorate.
D. Conclusion
This analysis of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws has shown that
what many Americans consider to be a fundamental entitlement, the right
to vote, is a privilege that can be revoked through a partisan political
process. The paradox is that this partisan political process is both the
greatest obstacle to the restoration of ex-felon voting rights in state legis-
latures controlled by Republicans and the most effective means to attain
this restoration in states controlled by Democrats.
Perhaps the most significant lesson we can take away from this dis-
cussion of ex-felon disenfranchisement is that in the twenty-first century,
decisions about even the most basic and fundamental principles of de-
mocracy are moderated by partisan politics. As long as voters elect
partisans to the legislatures, and as long as partisan and electoral interests
remain the most influential forces in state legislatures, the politicization of
any legal issue should not surprise Americans. It should be expected.
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